over to DeepMind the records of 1.6 million patients in 2015 on the basis of a vague agreement which took far too little account of the patients' rights and their expectations of privacy.
DeepMind has almost apologized. The NHS trust has mended its ways. Further arrangements—and there may be many—between the NHS and DeepMind will be carefully scrutinised to ensure that all necessary permissions have been asked of patients and all unnecessary data has been cleaned. There are lessons about informed patient consent to learn. But privacy is not the only angle in this case and not even the most important. Ms. Denham chose to concentrate the blame on the NHS trust, since under existing law it “controlled” the data and DeepMind merely “processed\But this distinction misses the point that it is processing and aggregation, not the mere possession of bits, that gives the data value.
The great question is who should benefit from the analysis of all the data
that our lives now generate. Privacy law builds on the concept of damage to an individual from identifiable knowledge about them. That misses the way the surveillance economy works. The data of an individual there gains its value only when it is compared with the data of countless millions more. The use of privacy law to curb the tech giants in this instance feels slightly maladapted. This practice does not address the real worry. It is not enough to say that the algorithms DeepMind develops will benefit patients
and save lives. What matters is that they will belong to a private monopoly which developed them using public resources. If software promises to save lives on the scale that dugs now can, big data may be expected to behave as a big pharm has done. We are still at the beginning of this revolution and small choices now may turn out to have gigantic consequences later. A long struggle will be needed to avoid a future of digital feudalism. Ms. Denham's report is a welcome start.
31. What is true of the agreement between the NHS and DeepMind? A. It caused conflicts among tech giants.
B. It failed to pay due attention to patient's rights. C. It fell short of the latter's expectations. D. It put both sides into a dangerous situation.
32. The NHS trust responded to Denham's verdict with ______.
A. empty promises B. tough resistance C. necessary adjustments D. sincere apologies
33. The author argues in Paragraph 2 that ________. A. privacy protection must be secured at all costs B. leaking patients' data is worse than selling it
C. making profits from patients' data is illegal D. the value of data comes from the processing of it
34. According to the last paragraph, the real worry arising from this deal is ________.
A. the vicious rivalry among big pharmas B. the ineffective enforcement of privacy law C. the uncontrolled use of new software D. the monopoly of big data by tech giants
35. The author's attitude toward the application of AI to healthcare is ______. A. ambiguous B. cautious C. appreciative D. contemptuous
Text 4
The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) continues to bleed red ink. It reported a net loss of $ 5.6 billion for fiscal 2016, the 10th straight year its expenses have exceeded revenue. Meanwhile, it has more than $120 billion in unfunded liabilities, mostly for employee health and retirement costs.
There are many bankruptcies. Fundamentally, the USPS is in a historic squeeze between technological change that has permanently decreased demand for its bread-and-butter product, first-class mail, and a regulatory structure that denies management the flexibility to adjust its operations to the new reality
And interest groups ranging from postal unions to greeting-card makers exert
self-interested
pressure
on
the
USPS's
ultimate
overseer—Congress—insisting that whatever else happens to the Postal Service, aspects of the status quo they depend on get protected. This is why repeated attempts at reform legislation have failed in recent years, leaving the Postal Service unable to pay its bills except by deferring vital modernization.
Now comes word that everyone involved—Democrats, Republicans, the Postal Service, the unions and the system's heaviest users—has finally agreed on a plan to fix the system. Legislation is moving through the House that would save USPS an estimated $ 28.6 billion over five years, which could help pay for new vehicles, among other survival measures. Most of the money would come from a penny-per-letter permanent rate increase and from shifting postal retirees into Medicare. The latter step would largely offset the financial burden of annually pre-funding retiree health care, thus addressing a long-standing complaint by the USPS and its union.
If it clears the House, this measure would still have to get through the Senate—where someone is bound to point out that it amounts to the bare, bare minimum necessary to keep the Postal Service afloat, not comprehensive reform. There's no change to collective bargaining at the USPS, a major omission considering that personnel accounts for 80 percent of the agency's costs. Also missing is any discussion of eliminating Saturday letter delivery. That common-sense change enjoys wide public support and would save the USPS $ 2 billion per year. But postal special-interest groups seem to have killed it, at least in the House. The emerging consensus around the bill is a sign that legislators are getting frightened about a politically embarrassing short-term collapse at the USPS. It is not, however, a sign that they're getting serious about transforming the postal system for the 21st century.
36. The financial problem with the USPS is caused partly by ________.
A. its unbalanced budget B. its rigid management
C. the cost for technical upgrading D. the withdrawal of bank support
37. According to Paragraph 2, the USPS fails to modernize itself due to ________.
A. the interference from interest groups